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Abstract—This paper presents PS0, an ontological framework
and a methodology for improving physical security and insider
threat detection. PS0 can facilitate forensic data analysis and
proactively mitigate insider threats by leveraging rule-based
anomaly detection. In all too many cases, rule-based anomaly
detection can detect employee deviations from organizational
security policies. In addition, PS0 can be considered a security
provenance solution because of its ability to fully reconstruct
attack patterns. Provenance graphs can be further analyzed to
identify deceptive actions and overcome analytical mistakes that
can result in bad decision-making, such as false attribution.
Moreover, the information can be used to enrich the available
intelligence (about intrusion attempts) that can form use cases
to detect and remediate limitations in the system, such as
loosely-coupled provenance graphs that in many cases indicate
weaknesses in the physical security architecture. Ultimately,
validation of the framework through use cases demonstrates
and proves that PS0 can improve an organization’s security
posture in terms of physical security and insider threat detection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Physical security is often overlooked when it comes to
information security. In addition, most organizations are op-
erating under the false assumption that all those who are
granted internal access are necessarily trustworthy. An or-
ganization’s physical security controls should be considered
equally important and prioritized as its technical and admin-
istrative (procedural) security controls. Physical access to an
organization’s secure areas, systems and data can reduce the
effect of the safety measures that are installed to ensure their
confidentiality, integrity and availability, thus, making it easier
for a malicious insider to perpetrate a crime. Common goals of
a malicious insider include espionage, sabotage, theft, fraud,
destruction of competitive advantage, corruption of critical
data, and disclosure of sensitive information. Stolfo et al. [1]
explain that there are three different vectors of insider attack:
misuse of access, defense bypass, and access control failure.
Verizon [2] reports that in average 25% of breaches in 2017
involved internal actors and 8% of the tactics used involved
physical actions. Since physical attacks can be carried out with
little or no technical knowledge we predict that the number of
attempted physical attacks and breaches will increase in the
future. An attacker only needs to identify one simple weakness
to get a point of entry and potentially cause havoc. Therefore,
it is important for organizations to identify and remediate
vulnerabilities in both physical and digital spaces.
Insider threats could be categorized based on their intent
as malicious or unintentional. A malicious insider deliberately
attempts to access and potentially harm an organization. On
the contrary, unintentional threat refers to situations in which
damage occurs as a result of an insider who has no malicious
intent.
Existing researches for insider threat detection focus on
monitoring and analyzing user activity to detect potential
system misuses and abuses in the digital space [3]–[15], with
some of them having more theoretical underpinning, and only
a few of them mentioning [16] or focusing on the physical
space [17]. Specifically, [17] present an ontology developed
for information security knowledge sharing by focusing on
data center physical security compliance. To the extent of
our knowledge our paper is the first one to present a holistic
data-driven approach for physical security that can improve an
organizations security posture against insider threats. Leaving
the physical factor out of the data analytics for insider threat
detection means that a massive attack vector is overlooked.
For example, failures in the systems of critical societal in-
frastructures caused by physical attacks can rapidly lead to
massive disruption in society and loss of lives. In addition,
solely relying on traditional access control systems to thwart
sophisticated attacks is inadequate, since they solely generate
isolated alerts and offer limited context. In all too many
instances, by the time security personnel manually determine
if the alerts present a real threat, the attackers already have
achieved their goals. Cybersecurity and physical security
should complement each other for detecting and preventing
malicious incidents that involve physical actions, accurately
and in a timely manner. In addition, Capelli et al. [18]
indicate that non-technical and technical indicators are equally
important to insider threat detection and prevention. Recent
work [19] introduced SOFIT, a knowledge base (ontology) of
individual and organizational sociotechnical factors for insider
threats that expands on ITIO [20] (ontology that focuses on
describing technical/cyber events). The authors demonstratedIEEE/ACM ASONAM 2018, August 28-31, 2018, Barcelona, Spain
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through a use case that non-technical indicators can enhance
proactive insider threat mitigation.
Physical security controls should not be treated as ”mere”
logging solutions, but being part of a larger strategy of ongoing
security operations leveraging data-driven analytics that can
provide the context and the forensic evidence needed for
undeniable attribution, as well as enable proactive attack mit-
igation. Traditional physical security strategies for deploying
physical access control systems do not take into considera-
tion approaches for data collection, storage and processing,
resulting in unintelligent solutions that trigger alerts only after
an identified unauthorized activity. It is also a fact that an
organization would need to utilize many resources to conduct
forensic analysis after a breach for tracing the perpetrator
(attribution) and reconstructing the attack, especially when
deception techniques have been employed. Knowing what
happened prior and after a successful compromise or attempted
attack would allow an organization to improve its security
strategy and policies, as well as proactively mitigate future
attempts.
This paper presents a new ontological framework and a
methodology that address the aforementioned limitations re-
lated to physical security and insider threat detection. Specifi-
cally, we present the PS0 framework - an ontology for physical
security that can facilitate forensic analysis and proactively
mitigate insider threats by using rule-based anomaly detection.
In all too many cases, rule-based anomaly detection can iden-
tify employee deviations from organizational security policies.
In addition, PS0 can be considered a provenance solution,
because of its capability to reconstruct attack patterns based
on the time-sequence between events. Provenance graphs can
be further analyzed to identify deceiving actions and overcome
bad decision-making, such as wrong attribution. Moreover, the
information can be used to enrich the available intelligence
(intrusion attempts) that can be used as use cases to detect and
remediate limitations in the system, such as loosely-coupled
provenance graphs that in many cases indicate weaknesses in
the physical security architecture.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we re-define physical security. Section III describes the steps
towards effective physical security and explains how it is
achieved by our framework (PS0) when converging infor-
mation technology and physical security. In Section IV we
introduce PS0, a new framework for effective physical security
and insider threat detection. Section V presents the developed
ontology that is used to conduct forensic data analysis and
proactive insider threat detection. Validation and experimental
results are provided in Section VI along with the forensic
analysis and rule-based anomaly detection for a particular use
case. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. DEFINING PHYSICAL SECURITY
Definition: Physical security is the use of physical and
procedural controls that are designed to effectively protect,
deter, respond, and recover from intentional and unintentional
events (e.g., fire, natural disaster, terrorism, vandalism, theft,
espionage and sabotage) that could cause serious loss or
damage against an organization’s critical assets (e.g., people,
data, facilities and systems).
Physical security controls include the functions of pre-
vention, deterrence, and detection through multiple layers of
interdependent systems, such as entry controls, physical bar-
riers, security guards, alarm and surveillance systems, motion
detection, proximity cards, biometrics, etc.
Procedural controls refer to security practices that are used
to mitigate identified risks by means of policies, procedures,
and guidelines.
III. EFFECTIVE PHYSICAL SECURITY
The reputational, financial and regulatory impact of having
an organization’s assets damaged, stolen, or disclosed can be
extremely serious and can lead to bankruptcy. Insiders are
difficult to detect since they belong to the organization and
have access and knowledge pertaining to the location of critical
assets and access controls. This amplifies when illegal activity
involves collusive employees that can easily bypass procedural
security controls or insiders that are unaware that are aiding a
threat actor (malicious insider).
To mitigate risks and protect critical assets from insider
threats, organizations should establish an effective insider
threat program fully integrated into the risk management
strategy taking into consideration the digital and the physical
spaces, simultaneously. In addition, the application of physical
security controls should be structured in layers that in many
cases overlap. There is no single physical control that will
fulfill all of an organization’s security needs.
Effective physical security, like cybersecurity, requires ac-
tions for identifying, analyzing, evaluating and mitigating risk
(risk management program). Techniques for risk identifica-
tion include brainstorming, interviews, checklists, statistics,
historical data and use cases, and modeling techniques, such
as attack trees and threat modeling. Our system supports the
risk identification process and overall the risk management
program by following a systematic iterative information en-
riching approach that allows ingestion of information derived
from forensic analysis after unsuccessful or succeeded attacks.
The risk indicators are analyzed collectively in order to un-
cover hidden relationships and thwart deception. The identified
patterns after risk analysis and evaluation should be used
to improve the overall insider threat program (physical and
logical-technical security).
Convergence of IT and physical security with analytics
should holistically work towards common objectives following
a risk management program and a clearly defined security
policy. For example, efforts to secure access to databases,
e-mail, and organizational networks are merging with access
control and surveillance systems and all together are part of
an analytics approach to deliver actionable information and
stimulate data-driven decisions.
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INSIDER
THREAT DETECTION (PS0)1
PS0 (Figure 1) is an ontological framework with provenance
capability for improving physical security and insider threat
detection. This is achieved by detecting and analyzing complex
attacks that involve physical actions that in many cases are
difficult to detect by traditional means. A key-point of the
technology is that it considers damaging incidents or events
in their entirety, thus, providing the appropriate visibility and
context needed for an organization to improve its security
posture and reduce risk against insider threats. This is at-
tained by adopting a systematic iterative information enriching
approach that allows, firstly to improve the security strategy
by identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities and secondly to
improve the rule-based system that tracks policy compliance
and suspicious activities. Successful implementation of PS0 re-
lies on early-adopted risk management practices for deploying
the appropriate physical, procedural and monitoring controls
providing the required level of security and visibility to an
organization’s critical assets and environment. Specifically,
PS0 addresses the following questions:
• How and when a compromise or attempt occurred
• What are the goals of the attack and potentially its impact
• Is there any activity violating any security policies that
could potentially be an indication of the early stages of
an attack or an unintentional insider
• Who is responsible for the compromise, attempt, or policy
violation
PS0 (Figure 1) adopts a layered deployment approach,
where related functionality is grouped into a common layer
that provides simple interfaces towards other layers and com-
ponents, thereby abstracting the internal design and structure.
The rest of the section introduces the components of PS0.
• Data Sources: includes any output from deployed se-
curity components, systems and available devices that
after processing (ontology compliant triples) is used from
our system to facilitate forensics, policy compliance, and
detecting abnormal activity. We distinct the data sources
in two categories.
– Physical Space: includes logs deriving from access
control systems, such as RFID readers, numpads,
motion sensors, cameras, biometrics and more.
– Systems: includes logs deriving from any solution
monitoring or protecting the digital space. This can
be aggregated and analyzed logs from endpoints (e.g.
sysmon), active directory, networks (e.g. NetFlow),
access points (network access), printers, as well as
other IP-based devices (BYOD).
Portable IP-based devices can play a major role in insider
threat detection and forensics (attack pattern reconstruc-
tion, attribution and deception) when logging their inter-
action with an organization’s network access points and
wireless beacon monitoring devices. This is achieved by
1PS0 Github repository: https://github.com/securitylab-ch/ps0
having a clear mapping between the media access control
address of a device, the user the device belongs to, and
the media access control addresses of the access points in
addition to the timestamp of the authentication and the
duration of the connection. Every new device seen for
the first time in the network is mapped to a user profile
based on the credentials used to access that network.
• Log Collection and Aggregation: includes the consistent
collection of data from their respective data sources and
their aggregation to an intermediary server for storage
and processing. After the collection, aggregation, and
processing of data (parsing engine) it is forwarded to the
core of the framework; the ontology. The intermediary
server should be able to maintain the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of the data. Unauthorized data
deletion or alteration would result in missing or wrong
provenance.
• Parsing Engine: this component is responsible for ma-
nipulating each output type to bring it to the appropriate
and consistent format (chunks of triples) based on the on-
tology schema and the restrictions specified. The parsing
engine will forward the created triples to the ontology.
• Ontology: is the main component of PS0 and in its
current state provides structured and unstructured infor-
mation about the infrastructure, physical security, user
profiles and user activity of an organization. The knowl-
edge base is used to facilitate forensics that can lead in
provenance graphs and attack attribution, to provide a
clear topology of an organizations infrastructure, critical
assets and stakeholders, as well as to ensure policy
compliance and detect abnormalities indicating threat
likelihood, through well-defined rules. Details about the
development of the ontology per se can be found in
Section V and on Github1.
• Forensic Analysis: includes the process of issuing
SPARQL queries to investigate a breach or to examine
abnormal activities and policy violations (aided by the
rule-based anomaly detection component). Early detec-
tion and swift investigation are critical to avert attack-
ers and responding to threats. Inadequate or missing
forensic data would result in loosely coupled provenance
graphs (missing links) and consequently reduced visibil-
ity (which indicates insufficient security measures). In
response to that, PS0 forensics can be used to identify
weaknesses and strengthen an organization’s security
strategy. Available analyzed information (intelligence)
from incidents can serve as use cases to validate an
updated security strategy and potentially being shared to
help other organizations improve their security posture.
Overall a successful forensic analysis should provide
complete attack pattern, attack context and rich intelli-
gence, infrastructure-wide visibility, and insights gained
from front-line experience investigating complex attacks.
• Rule-Based Anomaly Detection: traditional access con-
trol systems are vulnerable to social engineering and
can be easily bypassed by insiders. Rule-based anomaly
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Fig. 1: High-level design of PS0 framework.
detection focuses on detecting security policy violations
and suspicious activity that in many cases can easily
go unnoticed until an incident occurs. Detected suspi-
cious activity or policy violations are classified in the
ontology (”Incident” class) based on their threat level
(”red”, ”amber” and ”green”) and can be further analyzed
to uncover malicious intent, an attack in progress, or
negligent employees that can be potent attack vectors.
The classification is achieved through different rules
or restrictions categorizing incidents in their respective
threat level class. For the above requirements we created
OWL restrictions and we additionally used the semantic
web rule language (SWRL). OWL restrictions and rule-
based reasoning is an important feature of ontologies that
can be used to infer new information, as well as for
classification. A sample of rules that would flag threat
alerts is described right below. The rules should always
be aligned to an organization’s security policy.
– An individual was logged accessing one of the
organization’s secure environments (e.g., office,
workspace, data-center) or one of the organization’s
systems (e.g., endpoint device, local area network)
but was never logged entering the building or getting
access to a particular access controlled area.
– An individual was logged entering a building but was
never logged leaving the building in a specific time
period (the opposite also applies).
– An individual was logged accessing the building
more than one times but we do not have information
of this individual leaving the building.
– Unauthorized user tried to gain access to a system or
privileged credentials were used on regular worksta-
tions or servers which is considered policy violation.
– Events or incidents regarding access control to secure
environments can be classified as follows. Three
consecutive unsuccessful attempts (wrong PIN or
passphrase) to an environment from the same user
are classified as of high threat (red). The same
applies to unsuccessful attempts that are not followed
by a successful attempt in a specific time period. Two
missing attempts followed by a successful attempt in
a very short period is categorized as of low threat
(green). Other areas use RFID technology for access
control. Failed RFID attempts can be considered of
low threat (green).
• ISMS Development Plan: Information Security Man-
agement System (ISMS) is a set of policies, procedures,
technical and physical controls to protect the confidential-
ity, availability and integrity of an organization’s sensitive
data. An ISMS enables organizations to be significantly
more resilient to both external and internal cyber and
physical attacks and is responsible for coordinating cy-
bersecurity with physical security. PS0 should be part,
aligned, and support the improvement of an organiza-
tion’s ISMS.
V. PHYSICAL SECURITY ONTOLOGY
Part of our work was the development of an ontology
capable of consuming and representing information coming
from disparate data sources for conducting physical security
forensic analysis, insider threat detection, and policy compli-
ance. The ontology can be modified and adjusted taking into
consideration each organization’s unique infrastructure. The
rest of the section introduces the most important classes of
the ontology.
Person class includes detailed information of every entity
associated with an organization. Information include person-
ally identifiable information, associated roles, access rights and
many more.
GroupTeam and Department classes include information
about the organizational structure of an organization. A group
is a collection of individuals who coordinate their individual
efforts. A team is a group of people that come together to
achieve a common goal. In an incident with more than one
threat actors it is probabilistically possible that the accomplice
would be member of the same group or team.
RFID card class includes information about all the available
RFID cards distributed among stakeholders. In our case RFID
cards grant access to different levels and workspaces in a
building.
MAC Address class stores information about all the IP-based
devices that have been observed connecting to a network.
In addition, each MAC address is mapped to a specific
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Fig. 2: Main classes of the ontology.
person. Each person has its own credentials to connect to the
organizational network.
Building class maps a building (infrastructure) and enumer-
ates the exact location and details of every office, workspace,
security component and device.
Event class categorizes all the collected and aggregated logs
coming from the installed security components and systems.
Security Component class includes all the security solutions
installed and deployed (physical and logical controls) as well
as information about them. This class is tightly connected with
the class Building mapping the access control systems.
Incident class classifies unwanted behavior in different
threat levels. The information in this class is derived from
OWL restrictions and rule-based reasoning.
Device class includes detailed information about end-
devices (e.g., workstations, servers, printers, BYOD) and in-
termediary devices. End-devices can be mapped to specific
entities (e.g., employees, former employees, visitors) and
locations (e.g., exact location of a workstation or an access
point in a building).
VI. VALIDATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we validate our system into a real but at the
same time controlled environment, present the results, and dis-
cuss the limitations and the lessons learned. PS0 was deployed
at the Department of Informatics (IFI) at the University of Oslo
in July 2017. Figure 3 presents an architectural floor plan
demonstrating the location of available sensors and devices
that are part of the experiment.
Fig. 3: Architectural floor plan.
To validate the framework and the system we conducted
eleven different experiments analyzing ten different use cases
(scenarios) of incremental complexity. Each scenario was
analyzed by a different student (analyst), currently in the
process of acquiring a Master’s degree in IT. Furthermore,
the eleventh experiment investigated whether acquired domain
expertise would decrease the time needed to analyze a future
incident considerably. For that reason one analyst went through
the process of investigating all ten scenarios one by one. The
experiments were conducted for twelve consecutive days; one
day for each scenario (experiments one to ten) and two days
for the last experiment, eleven. None of the analysts had prior
experience with the system. All analysts had an initial one
hour training period before the forensic analysis to investigate
and get accustomed to the map of the building, as well as all
types of sensors and information available for manipulation.
For the sake of space, in this paper we demonstrate the
forensic analysis of use case five which is the cutting point in
terms of use case complexity and analysis time (Figure 4).
Fig. 4: Use case complexity vs. Analysis time.
A. Results
All eleven analysts without having any prior experience
with the system succeeded to identify the insiders. This is
mainly based on the intuitive approach the analysts followed
to investigate the incidents. In addition, experiment eleven
proved that accustomation to the physical security architecture
decreases significantly the time needed to perform the forensic
or detection analysis (see Figure 4). The decrease in time is
not related to approaches that include prepared queries from
acquired domain expertise or the time needed to create the
queries, but mainly the time needed to process the available
information and come up with an efficient and effective strat-
egy to analyze the information. The queries produce prove-
nance graphs (attack pattern reconstruction) based on the time
sequence of the events, thus, providing the appropriate context
needed for attack attribution and enriching intelligence.
Limitations of the system in its current state is the com-
plexity of creating the queries and the difficulty of analyzing
huge amounts of information (query results) when dealing with
big and complex environments. In response to that, prepared
queries, graphical user interfaces, or visualization techniques
(such as graph databases) can be leveraged to reduce the
complexity and support the analysis phase providing us with
a full contextual picture of the events and actions generating
the alerts.
B. Use Case Five - Description
The analysts that conducted the analysis did not have any
information about the use cases prior to the experiments. Use
case five is fully described to improve the readability and
understanding of this paper to the reader. K, V, and P are
three individuals working at the Department of Informatics of
the University of Oslo. K is working on the 8th floor and
is located in the office k with number 8468 (K−→ k). V
and P are working on the 9th floor and they are located in
the office v and p with numbers 9468 (V−→ v) and 9165
(P−→ p), respectively. Access to an office is granted only
when an individual successfully authenticates using its private
passcode. Both individuals entered the building together from
the 2nd level at 22h41 on July 21st using K’s RFID card.
K scanned his RFID card once more in the second floor to
access the lifts with V and again in the 8th floor to access
the main space where the offices are located. K accessed
his office k and V continued taking the stairs connecting the
8th floor to the 9th floor. When V reached the 9th floor he
walked towards the targeted office p (P−→ p). V was able
to access the office of P after successfully authenticating. It
seems that V shoulder surfed P in the past effectively acquiring
the information needed for launching the attack. Eventually,
V got into his hands a valuable flash drive with available
intellectual property (state of the art research). The attacker
repeating the same pattern went back to the 8th floor to find
K. The attacker was aiming to exploit K’s good intention and
use his RFID card to leave the building. Unfortunately, K had
left his office and the attacker V had to use his RFID card to
leave the 8th floor and then the building.
C. Use Case Five - Forensic Analysis
Having knowledge of the building structure, having a clear
understanding of the strategic points the sensors were installed,
knowing what kind of information the sensors log, and by
doing some intelligent analysis we can identify who the
attacker is. The conducted forensic analysis does not take
into consideration any rule-based abnormality inferred to begin
with, but it mainly focuses on manual analysis of the events.
We discuss the rule-based reasoning capability approach in the
next section. An analyst could take any different approach to
investigate the presented use case. The analysis below is one
out of many possible. Each incident is unique, thus domain
expertise would enable more efficient and effective forensic
analysis. This is demonstrated in Figure 4 where each use case
difficulty and time needed for completing a forensic analysis is
compared among different analyst for each use case (red data
points) and one analyst for all use cases (yellow data points).
For the analysis we used SPARQL, a semantic query lan-
guage able to retrieve and manipulate data stored in Resource
Description Framework (RDF). Initially, the only known fact
to launch the forensic analysis is that there was a breach in the
office 9165. We also know that P left his office at 19h24 and
accessed it again the following day at 8h32. First we check
what time P’s office was accessed during his absence, as well
as any failed attempts.
PREFIX ps0:
<http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ps0#>↪→
SELECT ?Event ?Date ?Success ?Fail
WHERE {
?Event ps0:hasNumpadSensor ?Numpad .
?Numpad ps0:hasPlace ps0:Room9165 .
?Event ps0:hasTime ?Date .
OPTIONAL
{
{?Event ps0:hasAccessGranted ?Success}
UNION
{?Event ps0:hasAccessNotGranted ?Fail}
}
FILTER (?Date >
"2017-07-21T19:00:00"ˆˆxsd:dateTime↪→
&& ?Date <
"2017-07-22T09:00:00"ˆˆxsd:dateTime)↪→
}
ORDER BY ?Date
The results of the query show that the office p was accessed
at 22h45. In addition, we do not see any failed attempts. The
analyst decided that the second query should determine if
anybody left from the 8th or the 9th floor after the breach.
In addition, the query was restricted to a specific time period
of seven hours and 15 minutes; from 22h45 to 06h00.
SELECT ?Event ?Date ?Location ?Place ?LastName
?FirstName ?Email↪→
WHERE {
?Event ps0:hasTime ?Date .
?Event ps0:hasReadId ?RfidId .
?Person ps0:hasRfidCard ?RfidId .
?Person ps0:hasLastName ?LastName .
?Person ps0:hasFirstName ?FirstName .
?Person ps0:hasEmail ?Email .
?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ?Sensor .
?Sensor ps0:hasLocation ?Location .
?Sensor ps0:hasPlace ?Place
{?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ps0:rfid91In}
UNION
{?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ps0:rfid81In}
UNION
{?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ps0:rfid22In}
UNION
{?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ps0:rfid21In}
FILTER (?Date >
"2017-07-21T22:45:12"ˆˆxsd:dateTime↪→
&& ?Date <
"2017-07-22T06:00:00"ˆˆxsd:dateTime)↪→
}
ORDER BY ?Date
The results show that an individual named V accessed the
lifts in the 8th floor at 22h47 and left the building a minute
later from the second floor. Since V is the only person that
left the 8th or the 9th floor after the incident, we request
more information regarding the individual’s pattern for this
particular day. Specifically, we would like to check what time
V entered the building, if V accessed his office, as well as any
pattern related to the incident from the logs of access points.
SELECT DISTINCT ?Event ?Date ?Location ?AP ?Place
WHERE {
?Event ps0:hasTime ?Date
{?Event ps0:hasEmail
ps0:vasileim\@ifi.uio.no .↪→
?Event ps0:hasAccessed ?MacAddress .
?AP ps0:hasMacAddress ?MacAddress .
?AP ps0:hasLocation ?Location}
UNION
{?Event ps0:hasReadId ps0:26964897076 .
?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ?Sensor .
?Sensor ps0:hasLocation ?Location .
?Sensor ps0:hasPlace ?Place}
UNION
{?Event ps0:hasNumpadSensor ps0:numpad9468}
FILTER (?Date >
"2017-07-21T07:00:00"ˆˆxsd:dateTime↪→
&& ?Date <
"2017-07-22T06:00:00"ˆˆxsd:dateTime)↪→
}
ORDER BY ?Date
Surprisingly in our results there is no information pointing
out that V accessed the building but interestingly one device
accessed the university’s network using V’s credentials. The
analyst knowing the security policy of the university assumed
that someone gave V access intentionally (opened the doors
for V) or unintentionally (V took the opportunity to enter
the building when someone else was entering or leaving).
Furthermore, the results show an interesting pattern. V was
in the eighth floor at 22h43, then appeared in the ninth floor
(most probably took the stairs), came back to the eighth floor
again after the incident, then accessed the lifts by scanning his
own RFID card, and finally left the building.
The analyst wanted to identify who gave V access and
investigate the incident in detail. First, we define a time period
of minus-plus 30 seconds from the first identified event related
to V (the observed remote authentication to an access point
close to the entrance of the building in the second floor). Next,
we check if in the same time period someone accessed or left
the building.
SELECT ?Event ?Date ?Location ?Place ?LastName
?FirstName ?Email↪→
WHERE {
?Event ps0:hasReadId ?RfidId .
?Event ps0:hasTime ?Date .
?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ?Sensor .
?Sensor ps0:hasLocation ?Location .
?Sensor ps0:hasPlace ?Place .
?Person ps0:hasRfidCard ?RfidId .
?Person ps0:hasLastName ?LastName .
?Person ps0:hasFirstName ?FirstName .
?Person ps0:hasEmail ?Email
{?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ps0:rfid21In}
UNION
{?Event ps0:hasRfidSensor ps0:rfid21Out}
FILTER (?Date >
"2017-07-21T22:41:00"ˆˆxsd:dateTime↪→
&& ?Date <
"2017-07-21T22:42:00"ˆˆxsd:dateTime)↪→
}
ORDER BY ?Date
The results show that an individual (K) actually accessed
the building from the second floor during the pre-defined time
period. We can confidently assume that K gave access to V.
D. Use Case Five - Rule-Based Anomaly Detection
Use case five inferred three indicators that were classified
into the ontology as incidents for further investigation and
flagged an alert. First, there is information that P’s office was
accessed but there is no event indicating that P entered the
building. Second, V’s credentials were observed connecting a
device to an access point but there is no event indicating that
V entered the building. Third, V was monitored leaving the
building but there is no event indicating that V actually entered
the building in the first place. The above information could be
used both proactively and retroactively to mitigate an insider
attack or aid an investigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In an idealistic environment any type of malicious activity
should be prevented or detected and mitigated but this is
almost never the case, especially when the attacker is a trusted
authority. It is the case that many times malicious activity goes
undetected for a long period and incidents are not reported in
a timely manner. For example, sabotage would be observed
in a short period due to its disruptive nature but espionage
could go undetected for a long period. In response to that,
we introduced and validated an ontology-based framework
(PS0) that integrates physical security controls with technical
and administrative security controls for improving the security
posture of organizations against sophisticated insider physical
attacks. Overall the framework supports proactive insider
threat detection and investigation, forensic data analysis for
attack attribution and thwart deception, reconstructing complex
attack patterns for enriching and sharing intelligence, as well
as continuous security compliance monitoring.
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